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Apollo 13 Case Study (part 1 of 2)
Objectives
 Describe the Service Module Electrical Power 
System hardware
 Describe the circumstances which led to the 
Apollo 13 accident
S i th Mi i C t l d ummar ze e ss on on ro  an  crew 
reaction
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Outline
 This briefing is Part 1 of 2 
¾ Overview of electrical system hardware
¾ Failure chain reconstruction
¾ In-flight oxygen tank explosion
¾ Immediate MCC reaction  
 Part 2 is a separate briefing
¾ MCC regains insight  
¾ Impact to various systems
¾ In-flight recovery 
¾ Entry
¾ Post-flight changes and lessons learned
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Electrical Power System Overview
 Service Module
¾ Provided majority of power required 
on the trip  
¾ Cryogenic H2 and O2 tanks fed three 
fuel cells
C ommand Module
¾ Rechargeable batteries primarily for 
entry, also supplement fuel cells for      
peak loads
¾ Powered some heaters and lights on 
the LM 
 Lunar Module
¾ Six batteries, normally used only for 
4
lunar descent and ascent
Fuel Cells
 Fuel cells & cryo 
located in Service 
M d lo u e
 Cryo O2 & H2 stored in 
tanks (2 each)  
 Fuel cells (3) provided 
primary power to CSM    
for duration of flight
5
Cryo Tank
Internal heaters keep Du  to zero-g, tanks To keep tanks – Normally performed 
periodically throughout thethe tank pressurizedbuild up a gradient of 
high and low 
pressure /
homogeneously 
mixed, Ap llo config 
had fans to “stir” the
   
mission
– Mixed tank yields better   
temperature / density
     
tanks
temperature, pressure, and 
quantity telemetry readings
– On Apollo 13, crew 
stirred the tanks several 
times with no problems 
prior to the explosion
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COMMAND/SERVICE MODULE POWER SYSTEM
Entry and 
Post-Landing 
Battery A Apollo 13 configuration 
t ti f id t
Batteries disconnected from Main BusesFuel cells 1 and 2 power SM Bus A, Main A, and AC1Fuel cell 3 powers SM Bus B, Main B, and AC2
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a ery 
Pyro Battery A
Pyro Battery B
Pyro Bus A
Pyro Bus B
Failure Chain Reconstruction (Part 1)
 October 1968, North 
American Rockwell
Fuel cell shelf
¾ Tank removed from Apollo 
10’s SM for mods
D i l t k h lf¾ ur ng remova , an  s e  
was accidentally dropped 2”
¾ Passed all tests, but fill line
Cryo O2
tank shelf       
probably displaced by 0.1”
Cryo H2 tanks
8
Displaced Fill Line
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Failure Chain Reconstruction (Part 2)
 March 1970, Countdown 
Demonstration Test at KSC
¾ O2 tank 2 didn’t empty as expected
¾ Detanking didn’t work 
Di i t d l fill¾ scuss ons sugges e  a oose  
line
¾ Vendor said if tank could be filled, it        
would be OK in flight
¾ Used use tank heaters to boil off 
i i O k 8 hrema n ng 2, too   rs
¾ Would take 45+ hours to replace 
shelf with O2 tanks
10
  
Failure Chain Reconstruction (Part 3)
 12 days before planned launch
¾ O2 tank 2 filled once more, but 
again needed heaters to empty tank     
 Detanking problem considered 
by Apollo managers
¾ Lots of attention paid to 
loose fill tube
¾ Very little attention paid to     
extended heater operations
 After extensive consideration 
given to potential problems, it 
was decided to leave it as is and 
proceed with the launch in April
11
      
1970
Failure Chain Reconstruction (Part 4)
 Postflight testing showed that heater thermostats 
did not work properly at 65 volts (KSC GSE 
)power
¾ Originally designed for 28 V, never redesigned to be 
compatible with 65 V as required in a 1965 spec          
change
¾ Thermostats supposed to cut off at 80° F (27° C), but 
high voltage welded the relays shut when opened under 
load
¾ Heaters stayed on and temps rose to ~1000° F (538°         
C) inside the tank
¾ Teflon insulation severely damaged
12
 Loose fill tube by itself wasn’t a problem
Heater Relay
What happens when you put 65 V through a 
relay designed to handle 28 V?
Melted silver 
contacts
13NASA photo S70-40850
In Flight
 Mostly unremarkable mission for first two days
¾ Launch
¾ Earth Parking Orbit
¾ Trans-Lunar Injection (02:26 G.E.T.)
¾ Trans Lunar Coast-  
 MET 46:43, at crew wakeup on FD3
¾ Capcom calls the crew: "The spacecraft is in real good          
shape as far as we are concerned. We're bored to tears 
down here."
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Failed O2 Sensor
 The O2 tank 2 quantity sensor failed off-scale high 
at tank stir #2 at 46:40
¾ Scheduled every ~24 hrs
¾ Failed quantity sensor caused MCC to request cryo stir 
more often 
¾ Apollo 13 Review Board found this to be completely 
unrelated to the heater problem that caused the accident
 Crew was lucky this sensor failed when it did
¾ Had the tanks continued on the normal cycle of every 24 
hrs, the stir that caused the explosion would likely have 
occurred while the LM was on the lunar surface and the 
CSM was orbiting the Moon
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Sequence of Events
46:40 O2 tank 2 quantity sensor failed off-scale low, resulted in 
h t d ti b t f ls or er ura ons e ween cryo an cyc es
55:52:30
(GET)
Crew got H2 low pressure indications (part of normal 
operating cycle). MCC requests that the crew turn fans on
55:53:20 Fans activated, power transient occurs
55:54:53 Crew feels a bang
16
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Sequence of Events
 Post-flight data reconstruction of time between fan 
activation (55:53:20) and explosion (55:54:53)
P t i t¾ ower rans en s
¾ AC & DC voltages drop, currents rise (indicative of a 
short)
¾ O2 tank 2 pressure rises 
¾ Sensors fail and/or go erratic
¾ Sudden accelerometer activity in X, Y, Z axes
¾ 1.8 second loss of data
¾ O2 tank 2 lost pressure and outside panel separated
¾ Main Bus B undervolt alarm
¾ C h b d f l h dd i ft
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rew ears a ang an  ee s a s u er n spacecra
Sequence of Events
55:54:53 Crew feels a bang
1.8 second loss of data from damage to high-gain antenna
55:54:56 Problem shows up in telemetry:
 High amps, low volts on main buses (including Main B 
Undervolt)
 O2 tank 2 sensors all failed
 O2 tank 1 pressure starts steady drop
 Various SM component temps rise a few degrees (from 
combustion of insulating materials and the leaking O2
outside of the tank)
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COMMAND/SERVICE MODULE POWER SYSTEM
Entry and 
Post-Landing 
Battery A Apollo 13 configuration 
t ti f id tService Module
70 A
70 A
Battery
Bus
A
AC 
I t 1
Fuel 
Cell 1
B
u
s
 
A
SM Bus
A
X
a  me o  acc en
Inverter 
DC & 
AC 
Control 
Ci it
AC 
Inverter 3
FLT
Non-ESS 
Bus 1
20 A
u
s
O2
H2
AC Bus 
1
nver er  
Fuel 
Cell 2
D
C
 
M
a
i
n
 
B
rcu s
Lunar 
Module
 
Bus Non-ESS 
Bus 2
h
t
 
a
n
d
 
P
o
s
t
l
a
n
d
i
n
g
 
B
u
B
a
t
t
e
r
y
 
R
e
l
a
y
 
B
u
s
To ECS
Fuel 
Cell 3 AC Bus 
2
AC 
Inverter 2X
70 A
70 A
20 A
From AC Bus 1 or 2
F
l
i
g
Cryogenic 
Subsystem
D
C
 
M
a
i
n
 
B
u
s
 
B
SM Bus
B
O2 tank 2
explodes
O2 tk 
1
leak
Entry and 
Post-Landing 
Battery B
Entry and 
Post-Landing 
B tt C
Battery 
charger
From DC Main Bus A and B
To Entry/Post-landing
Battery Charger switches
Battery
Bus
B
20
a ery 
Pyro Battery A
Pyro Battery B
Pyro Bus A
Pyro Bus B
“Houston, we’ve had a problem…”
dd hh mm ss
(55 hrs)
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Sequence of Events
55:54:53 Crew feels a bang
55:55:20 “OK, Houston…I believe we’ve had a problem here”
55:57:45 Fuel cell 3 fails, taking with it Main B and AC2
55:58 Fuel cell 1 fails
55:58:25 Main A undervolt since it’s taking all the load
56:09:07 CDR reports something venting (from O2 tank 1)
dd hh mm ss(56 hrs)
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Immediate Damage
 Damage 
¾ O2 tank 2 exploded, blowing off a panel cover on the 
SM changed spacecraft delta v by 0 5 fps,   -   .  
¾ Panel struck and damaged High-Gain Antenna
¾ Explosion shocked several RCS valves closed     
¾ Explosion shocked fuel cells 1 & 3 reactant valves 
closed 
¾ O2 tank 1 started leaking (would be empty in ~2.5 hrs)
¾ Venting produced forces that were eventually 
counteracted by Automatic Stabilization System    
¾ Many sensors failed off-scale high or low, or static, so 
flight controllers not sure they can trust their data
23
Apollo 13 SM Damage
24
NASA photo AS13-59-8500 
Apollo 13 SM Damage (Cont’d)
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Damage Reconstruction
Fuel cells
 Model on display at 
the Kansas 
C h
 
Quad C
osmosp ere
O2 tank 1
O2 tank 2
H2 tanks
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Originally retrieved from http://www.ninfinger.org/~sven/models/vault2006/A13_damage_model.jpg
Original photo courtesy Linden Sims, 
© 2008, all rights reserved 
Uncertainty in MCC
 Main B undervolt CM computer rebooted  ,   
 Five RCS valves closed, “random” thruster firings, 
attitude excursions 
 Inconsistent fuel cell/cryo readings –
instrumentation?
 Loss of fuel cells 1 and 3
27
NASA photo AP13-S70-35638
End of Part 1
 In part 2, we will:
¾ Discuss the Mission Control and crew reaction to the 
accident
¾ Discuss the impacts of the explosion to the various 
systems
¾ Discuss the changes made to future Apollo spacecraft 
and the lessons learned
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For More Information
 Report of the Apollo 13 Review Board
¾ Panel 1, Spacecraft Incident Investigation, Vol. 1: 
A l I ti ti 06/70noma y nves ga on, 
¾ Appendix B, Report of Mission Events Panel, 06/70
 Mission Operations Report  
¾ NASA-MSC Internal Report, Apollo 13, 4/28/70
 Apollo 13 Mission Report   
¾ MSC-02680 with PCN-1, 5/70
 Apollo Mission Familiarization for Constellation     
Personnel
¾ Apollo Wiki
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Apollo 13 Case Study (part 2 of 2)
Objectives
 In this lesson, we will:
¾ Discuss the Mission Control and crew reaction to the 
id tacc en
¾ Discuss the impacts of the explosion to the various 
systems
¾ Discuss the lessons learned and changes made for 
subsequent flights
2
Outline
 Previously, in Part 1: 
¾ Overview of electrical system hardware
¾ Failure chain reconstruction
¾ In-flight oxygen tank explosion
¾ Immediate MCC reaction  
 This is Part 2
¾ MCC regains insight  
¾ Impact to various systems
¾ In-flight recovery 
¾ Entry
¾ Post-flight changes and lessons learned
3
Uncertainty in MCC
 Main B undervolt, CM computer rebooted
 Five RCS valves closed, “random” thruster 
firings, attitude excursions
 Inconsistent fuel cell/cryo readings –
i t t ti ?ns rumen a on
 Loss of fuel cells 1 and 3
4
NASA photo AP13-S70-35638
MCC Regains Insight
 At first, suspected instrumentation
¾ Sort out false readings from true ones
¾ Some readings lost due to loss of Main B
 Realized O2 tank 2 lost when sensor power 
s apped to Main A and the co ld see real dataw      y u    
 Realized fuel cells 1 and 3 are down for good, 
and O tank 1 is leaking 2    
 Took about an hour to get full story
¾ Will lose all CSM power in less than 90 minutes         
¾ “Several hundred man-days” of post-flight data 
analysis to reconstruct the problem and sequence of 
5
events 
Post-incident Sequence of Events
55:55 Crew feels a bang
56:00 MCC begins directing troubleshooting on fuel cells, cryo, 
and electrical buses after fuel cells 1 and 3 fail
0:05 since 
explosion
56:14 Crew reports something venting from SM 0:19
56:15 Start emergency powerdown 0:20
56:41 Flight Director orders team to start working on power/traj 0:46
profile for flight back to Earth
57:32 Automatic stability control regained (though always had 
manual control)
1:38
57:40 LM powered up (with 15 min of fuel cell 2 left) 1:46
58:04 Entry Battery A activated, fuel cell 2 deactivated 2:10
58:34 Attitude control handed from CSM to LM 2:39      
58:40 CSM completely powered down 2:45
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Immediate Problems
 SM will run out of power in ~2.5 hours, need to 
power up LM
¾ State Vector, attitude control, course-correction burns
 Venting forces from the O2 tank putting motion 
on the stack but RCS subsystem is not fully  ,       
operative
7
Longer-Term Problems
 LM designed for 2 men for 2 days, needed to 
stretch consumables to 3 men for 4 days 
 Consumables management
¾ Stretch LM battery power to last for a return trip
St t h t l¾ re c  wa er supp y 
¾ Stretch LiOH supply for CO2 removal from air
¾ O for breathing not a concern they’d run out of the2     ,      
other consumables first
 Replan maneuvers to return crew ASAP
 Procedures and checklists for entry
8
Electrical Issues
When Main A undervolted, crew connected 
Entry battery A to Main Bus A
¾ Prevented total loss of power to CSM
¾ Battery taken offline for recharging when powerdown 
completed (battery A down to ~50%)     
 Faced with imminent loss of all CSM electrical 
power, LM required as “lifeboat”
 Need to charge CM batteries from LM
¾ Umbilical usually used to power LM from CM
¾ Procedure was non-standard and not in the checklists
Will motor-driven switches work in low temps?
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LM as a Lifeboat
 Idea for using the full LM as a lifeboat had been 
suggested but never worked in a simulation
¾ Pre-mission work with LM systems and CSM systems 
in minimum power configurations contributed greatly 
to the ability to provide suitable systems 
configurations
 MCC modified existing LM powerup procedures 
in real-time
¾ Aligned LM inertial platform manually 
R i d d d t d l d t¾ ev se  power own proce ures o re uce oa s o 
~20%
¾ Contingency plans also developed in case of battery
10
        
problem
SM RCS Propulsion Issues
 Explosion knocked out Quad C, other valves
¾ Venting giving rates in –Pitch and –Roll axes
 Pitch control lost with combo of Main B and 
Quad C
 Manual attitude control using thruster 
emergency valves on MCC call
A t t l i d h th t u o con ro  rega ne  w en rus ers 
reconfigured to use Main A power
 Loss of fuel cell power: all SM thrusters        
inoperative
¾ New procedure for CM/SM separation for entry
11
       
required
SM Propulsion
A
B
D
XC
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SM RCS
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-P
  
drain A2
-PQuads A&C: Secondary fuel 
isols shocked closed
Communications Issues
 Panel impacted the SM high-gain antenna, 
damaged one of the four dishes required for 
b dnarrow- eam mo e
 Loss of data for 1.8 seconds
R tt til th LM t d a y comm un  e  comm sys em powere  
up
SIVB S b d b f LM  - an  eacon on same requency as  
S-band
¾ MCC drove the SIVB slightly off frequency to allow         
lock onto LM carrier
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GNC Issues
 Danger of gimbal lock due to RCS problems
 Powerup of LM to get state vector and inertial 
platform alignment from CM before it failed
 Attitude control with off-nominal weight/CG
¾ LM not designed to be used with the CSM attached at 
the top
 Difficulty in using stars as alignment reference      
¾ O2 and debris cloud obscured views out the windows
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Life Support Issues
 Square LiOH cans from CM (to remove CO2) not 
compatible with round LiOH slots in LM
¾ Only 53 hrs of capability with LM alone, needed 
another 85 hrs
¾ In-flight maintenance (IFM) to adapt the LM cans        
using plastic Flight Data File covers, plastic bags, and 
lots of gray tape
 Some O2 left in CM surge tank and repress 
tanks
N ll d t th bi ft ti¾ orma y use  o repress e ca n a er ven ng
 Powerdowns also reduce heat loads, so less 
water required for cooling
16
   
How to fit a square peg into a round hole?
O C O
17
LM Li H can M Li H can
LiOH Removal Tool
NASA photo AS13-62-8929 
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Trajectory Issues
 After situation stabilized, MCC replanned 
trajectory to get crew home soonest – how and 
h t b ?w en o urn
¾ Direct Abort: quicker, but uses much more propellant, 
required SM jettison to lower weight     
¾ Circumlunar Abort: slower, but saves propellant
 Used LM Descent Propulsion System (DPS) 
instead of SPS due to high power usage and 
uncertain nature of SM structure
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Trajectory Burns
~38 fps burn to get into a free-return trajectory 
with an Indian Ocean splashdown at 152:00 
GET
Trajectory 
prior to 
fi t b t
Start of problem (55:55)
rs  a or  
maneuver First abort maneuver (61:30)
Pericynthion
PC+2 b t (79 28)Fi t
Pericynthion + 2 hrs (PC+2), ~890 fps burn to 
 a or  :rs  course 
correction 
(105:18)
Final course 
correction 
(137:40)
20
shorten return time with a Pacific Ocean 
splashdown (prime recovery site) at 142:53 GET
CSM Structural Issues
 Structural issues drove trajectory replan options
¾ If they jettisoned the SM early in order to get a bigger 
b ti f f CM h t hi ld t ldurn, ques ons o  exposure o   ea  s e  o co  
for extended duration 
¾ Health of SPS questionable/unknown, so decided to 
use LM Descent Propulsion System (DPS) for burns 
instead
I ith ld t t d d ti ssues w  co  empera ures an  con ensa on
¾ Will motor-driven switches work?
¾ Will condensation cause shorts?   
21
Condensation Issues
 Cold temperatures led 
to significant moisture 
d ti
Entry 
battery A A
con ensa on
 Close switches early, 
use circuit breakers as
A
Entry     
controller
 Insulation and blankets
 
battery 
C
   
put in place after Apollo 
1 likely prevented 
Entry 
battery 
B
B B
water-triggered short 
circuits
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Post-Incident Sequence of Events
55:55 Crew reports a bang
58:40 CSM completely powered down
61:30 Mid-course correction burn to establish free-return trajectory
69:30 MCC had final consumables plan: stay powered up until PC+2 burn, 
then power down PGNS
79:28 PC+2 burn to speed up return to 142 hrs GET (was 152 hrs)
82:37 LM powered down to 12 amps
94:19 Motor-driven switch test: make sure motors close relays, then use 
circuit breakers for power connections    
101:38 CSM powered up for 10 min for data gathering
105:18 Mid-course correction to lower perigee at Earth capture
112 11 CM b tt h t t:  a ery rec arge s ar
127:00 Entry procedures read up to crew
133:24 LM powered up early for crew due to extra margin
23
Final Margins
 Needed to get down to 24 amps and 3.5 lb H2O 
per day
¾ Powerdowns predicted to be 17 amps, 2.7 lbs H2O
¾ Actual usage was 12 amps and 2.5-2.8 lbs H2O 
 MCC allo ed cre higher electrical and ater w  w    w  
usage rate towards the end of the mission once 
it was determined that they had hours of margin        
 Margins at LM jettison:
P 189 6 h 4 5 hower .  amp- rs ~ .  rs
Water 28 lbs ~5.5 hrs
Oxygen 28.5 lbs ~124 hrs
24
LiOH LM stockpile ~150 hrs
MCC Planning
 MCC had initial set of course correction and 
entry procedures within 12 hrs of accident
¾ Modified and evaluated in simulators in Houston and        
KSC by backup crews
 Practical, safe, efficient, adequate, and timely
T j t l ti f ti diti f¾ ra ec ory eva ua ons o  con ngency con ons or 
LM and SM separation conducted and documented 
prior to the mission by mission-planning personnel at 
MSC
¾ Most of the LM/SM jettison steps extracted from other 
procedures which had been developed, tested, and 
simulated earlier
¾ Final procedures read to crew 24 hrs before entry, 
after 2 days of planning and evaluation
25
      
Apollo 13 Entry Plan
141:30 G.E.T.
EI-1:00
LM jettison from 
Nominal 
entry
Command Module 
orientation for 
entry
133:24 G.E.T.
EI-9:00
CSM powerup for 
CM
142:30 G.E.T.
EI
137:40 G.E.T.
Final course 
correction for 
Enters earth’s 
atmosphere
entry, enough 
margin to start 
early
proper entry angle
Chutes open and Command 
M d l l d i
138:02 G.E.T.
EI-4:30
SM jettison:
+X thrust from LM o u e an s n ocean   , 
separate SM from CM, 
then –X thrust from 
LM/CM. Then take 
pictures of SM
142:54 G.E.T.
26
  Splashdown
Post-separation from SM
 Crew took photos/video of the SM after jettison, 
the first time anyone had seen the damage.
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NASA photo AS13-59-8500 
Root Cause of Accident
 Heater voltage specs changed but nobody 
noticed
¾ Original specs (1962): use 28 VDC as in the CM
¾ Revised specs (1965): be compatible with up to 65 
VDC as at KSC   
¾ Wiring changed to handle higher voltage, but vendor 
didn’t change the heaters to be compatible with 65 
VDC
¾ Discrepancy overlooked by Beech (tank vendor), 
Rockwell (prime contractor) and NASA  ,  
¾ Qual and acceptance testing not performed under 
load, only opened during special detanking
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Contributing Factors
 “Improvised” detanking procedures
¾ Tank hadn’t been qualified for those conditions, 
lth h d did ’t i l t ti ta oug  proce ures n  v o a e opera on specs a  
KSC or Beech
¾ Standard procedures at Beech but not KSC
 Tank temperature meter pegged off-scale high 
at 100° F (38° C)
¾ Impossible on the ground to realize that temps were 
too high
 During detanking, nobody monitored heater 
current readings to make sure they shut off 
when expected
29
 
¾ Only that they came on when expected
Error Chain
 Like most error chains, if any of the items below 
were different, there would have been no 
id t A ll 13acc en  on po o 
¾ Heater relay never modified for higher voltage [1965]
¾ Tank dropped 2 inches and displaced fill line [1968]        
¾ Decision to drain the tank with heaters (8 hrs) instead 
of replacing it (45 hrs) [1970]
¾ Heaters left on to drain the tank
¾ Nobody monitored heater to make sure it came off
¾ Temperature meter didn’t show proper range
¾ Insufficient attention paid to fact that heater stayed on 
for so long
30
  
Lessons Learned 1
 O2 tank design was inadequate and conducive 
to explosive failure. 
¾ Reduce the amount of combustible material in the 
tank and reduce the potential ignition sources within 
the tank
 Modified system should undergo rigorous 
requalification testing with particular attention to 
potential operational problems
31
Lessons Learned 2
 C&W system had flaws
¾ It locked out alarms that should have been made
E l H t k l i di ti ( hi h d th xamp e: 2 an  pressure ow n ca on w c  rove e 
tank stir in the first place) inhibited the O2 tank pressure 
alarms
¾ It didn’t annunciate some that should have been 
 Example: MCC didn’t realize that O2 reactant valves to the 
fuel cells were closed because sensors only indicated when 
both O2 and H2 were closed, not just one
¾ It annunciated some because the limits were too tight
 Example: Cryo H C&W limits were too close to the actual  2         
heater limits, and alarms went off when not needed
¾ Would not have changed outcome, but would have 
i d MCC it ti l
32
mprove   s ua ona  awareness
Lessons Learned 3
 Consumables and emergency equipment in the 
LM and the CM should be reviewed to determine 
h th t h ld b t k t h th iw e er s eps s ou  e a en o en ance e r 
potential for use in a "lifeboat" mode 
¾ Example: incompatible LiOH cartridges between the      
LM and CM 
 It is not practical to develop, simulate, and 
practice procedures for use in every possible 
contingency.
¾ However, simulations provide MCC with cases where 
they can learn to adapt existing procedures and 
philosophy instead of having to create new ones from
33
         
scratch
Lessons Learned 4
Whenever significant anomalies occur in critical 
subsystems during final preparation for launch, 
t d d d h ld is an ar  proce ures s ou  requ re a 
presentation of all prior anomalies on that 
particular piece of equipment including those   ,   
which have previously been corrected or 
explained. 
 Critical decisions involving the flightworthiness of 
subsystems should require the presence and full 
participation of an expert who is intimately 
familiar with the details of that subsystem.
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Lessons Have Been Learned
 Shuttle and ISS veterans will recognize many of 
these lessons as the way things are currently 
done
¾ Flight Techniques Panels
¾ Joint Operations Panels  
¾ Flight Readiness Reviews
¾ Mission Control Flight Rules   
35
Post-Flight Changes
 Redesign of O2 tank system
 Upgraded Fuel Cell instrumentation
 Updated Caution & Warning
 Third O2 tank added to Apollo 14
 Added extra LM and SM batteries
 Added circuit protection on power transfer cable
36
Redesigned Oxygen Tank
37
NASA photo S71-16745
Battery Upgrades for Apollo 14
 Two LM Descent 
Batteries @ 12 kWh 
i t ll dns a e
¾ SM “Auxiliary Battery”, 
could connect to CM Main     
Buses via fuel cell 2 
distribution
h¾ LM “Lunar Battery”, 5t
Descent stage battery
¾ To be utilized in a similar      
situation on the way back 
from the mooon
38
Board Findings
 “It was found that the accident was not the result 
of a chance malfunction in a statistical sense, 
b t th lt d f l bi tiu  ra er resu e  rom an unusua  com na on 
of mistakes, coupled with a somewhat deficient 
and unforgiving design ”  .
 “The accident is judged to have been nearly 
catastrophic. Only outstanding performance on     
the part of the crew, Mission Control, and other 
members of the team which supported the 
operations successfully returned the crew to 
Earth.”
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For More Information
 Report of the Apollo 13 Review Board
¾ Panel 1, Spacecraft Incident Investigation, Vol. 1: 
A l I ti ti 06/70noma y nves ga on, 
¾ Appendix B, Report of Mission Events Panel, 06/70
 Mission Operations Report  
¾ NASA-MSC Internal Report, Apollo 13, 4/28/70
 Apollo 13 Mission Report   
¾ MSC-02680 with PCN-1, 5/70
 Apollo Mission Familiarization for Constellation     
Personnel
¾ Apollo Wiki
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